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This study explores why academic entrepreneurs seek patents for their inventions before and after 
spin-off creation. Specifically, we examine (1) the relative impact of academic, business, and 
entrepreneurial rationales and (2) changes in patent propensity throughout the founding process. 
Findings based on 160 technology spin-offs combined with patent data show that some academic 
and business rationales, but also entrepreneurial rationales (technological uncertainty, tacit 
knowledge) affect patent propensity. Surprisingly, academic entrepreneurs with patents prior to 
founding patented less after founding. We discuss the implications of our results both in terms of 




Sooner or later, academic entrepreneurs have to make the critical decision to seek patents 
for their invention or not. Patents can safeguard the knowledge-base of a new venture against early 
imitation by defining property rights over an invention (Harter, 1994). They serve as signals of 
expertise (Arundel, 2001), attract venture capital (Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, & Binks, 2006; 
Mann & Sager, 2007), support inter-firm partnering (Hertzfeld, Link, & Vonortas, 2006), and, if 
effective, yield substantial competitive advantage (Kaiser, 2009; Song, Podoynitsyna, van der Bij, 
& Halman, 2008). On the other hand, patents require to disclose critical information, thereby 
facilitating early imitation (Arundel, 2001; Kultti, Takalo, & Toikka, 2007). Patenting consumes 
considerable time and money. It can also be a suboptimal strategy for spin-offs because, in case of 
infringements, many new ventures may lack the resources necessary to effectively litigate and 
enforce their rights (Arundel, 2001; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). Given this fundamental 
tradeoff, when and why do academic entrepreneurs patent? 
 
Prior research on patenting has focused on the starting and end point of the founding 
process, being the full-time scientist (Azoulay, Ding, & Stuart, 2007; D’Este & Perkmann, 
forthcoming; Dietz & Bozeman, 2005; Meyer, 2006; Sellenthin, 2009) or the established firms 
(Arundel & Kabla, 1998; Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Mansfield, 1986). Academic 
entrepreneurs constitute an intermediate group. They transit from the academic world emphasizing 
open knowledge sharing and peer recognition to the business world emphasizing private property 
and profits. They have to balance academic and entrepreneurial career interests. This may include 
resolving conflicts of interests in patenting between the home university and the prospective 
venture. The founding process can therefore yield important changes regarding self-perception 
(Jain, George, & Maltarich, 2009), strategic posture (Hoang & Gimeno, 2010), and, as we suspect, 
preference for patents. To date, however, relatively little is known about whether and why 
academic entrepreneurs seek patents and how their patenting propensity changes over time. This is 
surprising, given that employing the wrong rationales – for instance, patenting for academic 
 reputation (Göktepe-Hulten & Mahagaonkar, forthcoming) when a secrecy strategy should be 
pursued – may seriously compromise a spin-off’s long-term survival. 
 
Our study explores empirically why academic entrepreneurs seek patents in the founding 
phase (three full years prior to and after incorporation of their ventures) – a time when the ground 
for the future of the spin-off is laid and possible effects of the “scientist-to-entrepreneur-
metamorphosis” may become most visible. We focus on two important aspects. The first is the 
relative effect of influences suggested in the literatures on patenting by full-time scientists 
(academic rationales), patenting by established firms (business rationales) and influences 
particularly relevant to new ventures (entrepreneurial rationales). The second aspect is the impact 
of role changes and learning. Specifically, we argue that academic entrepreneurs who more readily 
adopt the entrepreneurial role, as reflected in high entrepreneurial orientation, are more likely to 
seek patents. We also propose that academic entrepreneurs with a preference for patents 
professionalize their patenting over time, thus seek more patents after than prior to founding. A 
unique dataset from 160 technology spin-offs from public universities combined with patent data 
allows us to test our hypotheses in a context in which patenting is a critical strategic decision and 
substantial patentable know-how is involved. 
 
This paper extends the literature on multiple fronts. First, the study provides an empirical 
test of established, partly competing influences on the patent propensity of a special and neglected 
group - academic entrepreneurs. Such a test bridges the divide between two literatures that have 
evolved in relative isolation and have either looked at scientists or incumbent firms. The results 
demonstrate that patenting by academic entrepreneurs is only limitedly driven by well-known 
academic and business rationales, but also by relatively unexplored rationales, including 
technological uncertainty and tacit knowledge. Second, scholars of industrial patenting have 
argued that technological competition should increase patenting (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). The 
finding of an inverted U-shaped relationship in this study suggests that patenting is no attractive 
option for academic entrepreneurs when technological competition is very low or very high. Third, 
the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and business performance is well-established 
(Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009). This study extends the literature by linking 
entrepreneurial orientation to patent propensity. 
 
THE DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS 
 
In our model, academic entrepreneurs face two basic options. The first is to seek patents. In 
the pre-founding phase, some jurisdictions permit the inventor to independently file a patent 
(Sellenthin, 2009), others entitle research organizations to do so on behalf of their employees (e.g. 
the Bayh-Dole Act, Henderson, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 1998). The inventor is then required to 
disclose the discovery, let the organization decide whether to patent and, in case, obtain a license 
prior to firm founding. Otherwise, he or she can patent in his or her own name. In the post-
founding phase, academic entrepreneurs have full discretion over patenting the spin-off’s 
inventions. The second option is not to seek patent protection and rely on alternative appropriation 
mechanisms instead. Despite potential legal and ethical risks (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008), 
academic entrepreneurs might decide to conceal a discovery from the administration when 
patenting is not regarded as an appropriate strategy or an institutional patenting infrastructure is 
lacking or ineffective (Baldini, 2009). Indeed, many faculty members do not disclose their 
inventions (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008; Landry, Amara, & Saïhi, 2007; Jensen, Thursby, & 
Thursby, 2003). Sometimes even universities avoid official regulations and let researchers exploit 
inventions themselves (Sellenthin, 2009). The subsections below provide arguments why 
 academic entrepreneurs should seek patents for academic, business, and entrepreneurial rationales 




Institutional publication performance refers to the impact of publications by researchers 
affiliated with the organization and should be positively related to patent propensity. Often the 
same research is patentable and publishable (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002). Publications and 
patents are increasingly seen as complementary rather than substitute activities (Fabrizio & Di 
Minin, 2008; Meyer, 2006; Thursby & Thursby, 2005; Van Looy, Callaert, & Debackere, 2006). 
Patents serve as an extra publication from the same research, thereby helping to gain reputation in 
academia and industry (Agrawal & Henderson, 2002; Göktepe-Hulten & Mahagaonkar, 
forthcoming). Moreover, universities emphasizing publication excellence typically attract, recruit, 
and train high-quality researchers. They provide a context in which reputation building through 
publications is valued. Yet, scholarly publications are also an important information source for the 
industry (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). Complying with publication norms therefore requires 
academic entrepreneurs to patent, in order to prevent unintended knowledge flows. Prior studies 
confirmed a positive relationship between patenting and the impact, but not the number of 
publications (Baldini, 2009; Calderini, Franzoni, & Vezzulli, 2007; Carayol, 2007; Landry et al., 
2007). Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the institutional publication performance, the more likely are 
academic entrepreneurs to seek patents. 
 
Institutional research focus. Universities concentrating on applied research receive more of 
their research budget from industry than other organizations (Henderson et al., 1998). We argue 
that such a focus is positively related to patenting propensity. The sponsor can encourage 
researchers to strive for commercially-oriented discoveries and align their research to the needs of 
the industry (Landry et al., 2007). Applied research is more likely to results in patentable 
inventions that are readily applicable to industrial problems and have commercial value (Di 
Gregorio & Shane, 2003). Supporting this argument, Sellenthin (2009) reported a positive 
relationship between conducting applied research and patenting. Moreover, industrial funding was 
found to raise patenting propensity (Carayol, 2007; Dietz & Bozeman, 2005; Landry et al., 2007). 
Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  The stronger the institutional focus on applied research, the more likely 
are academic entrepreneurs to seek patents. 
 
Institutional patenting experience refers to a university’s cumulative experience in 
patenting and should increase the founders’ willingness to seek patents. Academic entrepreneurs 
pursuing a patenting strategy are interested in filing high-quality patents that secure competitive 
advantage and prevent competitors from inventing around the patent (Arundel, 2001). Bayh-Dole-
like acts have empowered many universities to decide on the content of patents for disclosed 
inventions (Harhoff & Hoisl, 2007). Although some institutions, particularly top universities in the 
US (Shane, 2002), offer advanced support in patenting, this is not always the case for other 
institutions and/or countries. Findings for Italy, for instance, suggest that a lack of support by the 
university administration hinders patenting (Baldini, 2009). Similarly, researchers and universities 
in Germany were found to avoid the public infrastructure (Sellenthin, 2009). For academic 
entrepreneurs, disclosing inventions can thus pose a considerable risk that the university files low-
quality patents. If no other information on the institutions’ patenting competence is available, 
 cumulative experience serves a quality signal. Experienced institutions have developed knowledge 
about effective patenting in a learning-by-doing process (Mowery, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2002; 
Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003). They may be less likely to “make the same mistake twice” and may 
provide better support, thereby increasing the founders’ confidence in patenting via the 
organization. Indeed, studies have shown that scientists in institutions with more patenting 
experience (Calderini et al., 2007) and greater support (Sellenthin, 2009) tend to patent more 
actively. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
  
Hypothesis 1c: The higher the institutional patenting experience, the more likely are 




Inter-firm partnerships. Many spin-offs need external partners to further develop and 
market applications from the core technology. Arm-length cooperations can lead to unintended 
knowledge spillovers between the parties, posing considerable risks for technology-based spin-
offs (Alvarez & Barney, 2001). Patents provide a means to keep the other side from appropriating 
and/or using such knowledge by establishing clear property rights over the shared knowledge 
(Arundel, 2001). Moreover, patents facilitate treating a firm’s knowledge as a documented, 
formalized, and tradable asset (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999), thereby helping to negotiate and 
manage such partnerships. Patents belong to the most frequently used mechanism to protect 
technologies brought to and created in R&D collaborations (Hertzfeld et al., 2006). Thus, ceteris 
paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The more extensive inter-firm partnerships, the more likely are academic 
entrepreneurs to seek patents. 
 
Export orientation refers to the share of sales due to exports. Spin-offs entering foreign 
markets require effective safeguards of their technologies as they face additional competition in a 
new, unknown environment. They often have no prior information on exchange partners which 
causes problems of information asymmetry and raises the risk of opportunistic behavior. In line 
with this argument, Ivus (2010) found that stronger property rights increased the quantity of 
exports into developing countries. Similarly, Arundel and Kabla (1998) observed a higher patent 
propensity of firms that sell products on foreign markets. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the export orientation, the more likely are academic 
entrepreneurs to seek patents. 
 
Technological competition captures the intensity of rivalry in a technological field (Arora 
& Ceccagnoli, 2006) and should have an inverted U-shaped relationship with patenting. At low 
levels of competition, founders may perceive the threats of knowledge leakages and appropriation 
as too low to justify considerable investments of time and money involved in patenting. With 
uprising competition, more competitors begin to work on the same technology and the risks 
associated with rivalry, such as knowledge leakages, grow. Academic entrepreneurs are 
increasingly required to protect their core technology against imitation and secure their niche 
market through strong proprietary rights to key technologies (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Blind, Edler, 
Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006). Moreover, new firms are also increasingly competing with other 
newcomers for external funding and market shares. In this situation, signaling technological 
quality through patents becomes more important to attract potential investors and customers (Hall, 
2005; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009). As technological competition continues to grow, the 
 intensified research activity in the field accelerates technological progress, thereby reducing the 
life time of established technologies. The time to reap the benefits of patents declines and 
patenting becomes a less attractive alternative. Academic entrepreneurs begin to carefully weigh 
benefits and costs of employing a patenting strategy. When competition exceeds a certain level, 
the life time of a technology becomes too short to warrant extensive investments in patenting. This 
leads founders to consider alternatives to patents. The above arguments suggest that the 
motivation to patent increases with technological competition to a certain level, a tipping point, 
and then drops again – an inverted U-shaped relationship. Consequently, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 2c: The relationship between technological competition and academic 




Technological uncertainty describes the perceived degree to which the process of 
developing marketable products from the core technology is predictable and controllable. If 
technological uncertainty is high, the time, costs, and supportive technologies necessary to 
develop products from the core technology cannot be foreseen. Technological uncertainty is an 
aspect particularly salient to academic entrepreneurs: While most established, large firms possess 
a mix of new and mature technologies that allow to balance cash flows between different units, 
academic spin-offs are typically dependent on commercializing one new technology without 
having supplementary income from other businesses (Bhide, 1994). Technological uncertainty 
should increase patent propensity. Alternative IP protection strategies like secrecy or time lead on 
competitors assume that firms quickly develop and market products to realize first-mover-
advantages. In situations, where the time to yield marketable products and the number of resulting 
products is hardly predictable, such strategies appear to be less applicable. Patent protection, in 
turn, allows academic entrepreneurs to experiment with different designs of commercial 
applications for a technology and adopt it to market needs before competition sets in (Shane, 
2001). Furthermore, technological uncertainty lengthens time-to-market and increases the 
likelihood that the academic entrepreneurs do not discover marketable applications of the 
technology. Patents allow to secure some minimum value from the technology even if product 
development fails. Thus, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the technological uncertainty, the more likely are the academic 
entrepreneurs to seek patents. 
 
Tacit knowledge comprises knowledge tied to the senses, tactile experiences, intuition, 
unarticulated mental models, or implicit rules of thumb (Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009). It tends to 
be highly personal and difficult to transfer (Polanyi, 1966). In established firms, different 
individuals possess critical tacit knowledge, manage and own the firm, causing agency problems. 
Firms often patent to safeguard against knowledge losses when key R&D employees quit to join 
or start a rival (Kim & Marschke, 2005). In contrast, academic entrepreneurs combine tacit 
knowledge about the core technology and ownership of the spin-off. Tacit knowledge should also 
be positively related to patent propensity, but for different reasons. First, given their expertise, 
scientists high in tacit knowledge are more likely to arrive at novel and non-obvious discoveries, 
possibly applicable to patent protection. Often such knowledge cannot be completely codified or 
scientists have few incentives to do so because returns to codification are below returns to time 
invested in further research (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 2002). Nevertheless, filing at least 
some patents permits the entrepreneurs to reap key benefits from patenting, such as building 
reputation (Blind et al., 2006) or attracting venture capital (Wright et al., 2006). Even if these 
 patents fail, sufficient tacit knowledge is left to shield the venture’s knowledge base against 
imitation. Second, tacit knowledge can complement patents, thereby providing a more effective 
shield against imitation. Many core technologies are based on more than one patentable invention. 
Founders high in tacit knowledge can employ a hybrid protection strategy by patenting one (part 
of an) invention and keeping another one secret (Arundel, 2001). If competitors require both parts 
to imitate a technology, the technology is safe as long as one safeguard holds. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the tacit knowledge, the more likely are the academic 




Learning to patent. The founding phase is a time of comprehensive learning (Cope, 2005; 
Ravasi & Turati, 2005). We argue that academic entrepreneurs learn to patent more strategically 
over time, thus should patent more intensively after than prior to founding. Fully preparing for the 
challenges of entrepreneurship is difficult (Cope, 2005). Many entrepreneurs have little prior 
knowledge on effective patenting and have to acquire such expertise through experience (Ravasi 
& Turati, 2005) or social ties (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Effective institutional support is not 
always available (Baldini, 2009; Sellenthin, 2009). This can lead the founders to initially file, 
alone or together with the research organization, weak or too few patents. As the experience of the 
founders grows over time, some receive a first feedback on the effectiveness of their patents. 
Moreover, an increasing number of actors with patenting expertise becomes involved in the 
founding process. Some spin-offs, for instance, receive support from venture capital firms, some 
move into science parks that foster an exchange with other start-ups. Learning by doing or 
learning from social ties can show the inadequacy of prior patenting. The need for a more 
elaborate patenting strategy may become obvious. This often involves filing more patents, for 
instance, to build effective patent portfolios (Blind, Cremers, & Mueller, 2009) or patent fences 
(Reitzig, 2004). Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Academic entrepreneurs with patent applications in the pre-founding phase 
will patent more intensively after than prior to founding. 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation. Academic entrepreneurs differ in the speed and extent of 
adjusting to business norms (Hoang & Gimeno, 2010; Jain et al., 2009). We argue that founders 
who more readily adopt entrepreneurial roles, as reflected in high entrepreneurial orientation, are 
more likely to seek patents. Entrepreneurial orientation is defined as the processes, structures, and 
behaviors of firms that are characterized by innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking (Covin 
& Slevin, 1989; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Entrepreneurial-oriented founders tend to compete on 
the basis of their technological skills in the belief that successful innovation emanates from 
effective R&D (Atuahene-Gima & Ko, 2001). They strive for a technology leadership rather than 
a follower strategy (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), which drives them to dedicate a higher share of their 
expenses to R&D than other firms (Renko, Carsrud, & Brännback, 2009). Because of their focus 
on an exploratory, risk-seeking approach to innovation, such firms are likely to be the first to 
arrive at new inventions that can be protected by patents. Moreover, patent protection creates 
favorable conditions to experiment with new technologies in a pursuit for more creative product 
applications (Shane, 2001). Firms with well-protected technological bases can therefore follow a 
more aggressive growth strategy with a lower risk of knowledge leakages. Patents help to “stake 
claims” on the market and defend a “pole position” in a possible technology race that many spin-
offs have at the outset. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
  
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the entrepreneurial orientation, the more likely are the 




Sample and procedure 
 
This study combines survey and patent data. Survey data came from face-to-face interviews 
with academic entrepreneurs. We contacted 524 technology spin-offs via phone to request 
interview appointments. Of these, 288 agreed to participate. Trained interviewers then conducted 
interviews with one founder of each spin-off. Analyses reveal no significant differences between 
participating and non-participating firms in terms of age, size, and technological field. After 
excluding firms not based on technology, older than ten years, and not originated in public 
universities, the final sample comprised 160 spin-offs. Patent data came from the database 
“PATSTAT” (version 09/2008) provided by the European Patent Office (EPO). We searched for 
patent applications in two periods, the pre-founding phase (three full years prior to incorporation) 
and the post-founding phase (three full years after incorporation). Incorporation was chosen as a 
dividing line as it enables the academic entrepreneurs to patent in the name of the spin-off. 48 (36) 
spin-offs had filed patents prior (after) incorporation. Technological fields included 
software/simulation (32%), biotechnology (23%), electronics (19%), nanotechnology/new 
materials (11%), and others (15%). The average venture had been in business for five years (mean 
= 4.99; s.d. = 2.22), had three founders (mean = 3.19; s.d. = 1.61), and employed eleven full-time 




Dependent variables. Patent propensity refers to the tendency of an individual or a group to 
seek patents for inventions. Following Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999), we adopted two 
alternative measures. The first is a dummy variable for the mere existence of applications (0 = no 
patents filed, 1 = patents filed). It reflects the willingness to use patents at all. The second is the 
number of patent family applications. A patent family comprises all patent applications based on 
the same invention in different jurisdictions. Grouping patent applications into families avoids 
redundant counts by considering the same invention only once in our data (Lettl, Rost, & von 
Wartburg, 2009). This measure captures the extent to which academic entrepreneurs opt for 
patents. In the pre-founding phase, we considered patent applications based on a founder’s 
invention and either filed by a founder or the university. The database contained no information on 
which of university patents were actually licensed back and used by the spin-off. We therefore 
inspected the content of the patents and included only those patents matching the spin-off’s core 
technology. In the pre-founding phase, we searched for patent applications by the spin-off. 
 
Independent variables. To measure institutional publication performance, we computed 
citation counts from the Web of Science, an established source also used in prior studies (e.g. 
Azoulay et al., 2007). Our search included journal articles published by university researchers 
within five full years prior to the spin-off’s incorporation. Following Calderini et al. (2007), we 
operationalized institutional patenting experience as the total number of patents filed by the 
institution within the five-years-period, excluding patents co-filed by industry partners. Focus on 
applied research was captured as the EURO value of industry funding per professor of each 
university, a measure similar to Di Gregorio and Shane (2003). We gathered data from surveys by 
the Federal Statistical Office (Series 11-4.3.2, e.g. Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). Network size 
 was measured as the number of collaborations with research organizations and competitors. 
Compared to prior measures (e.g. Arundel, 2001), we added competitors as they are important 
research partners able to quickly absorb and use partner knowledge (Dussauge, Garrette, & 
Mitchell, 2000). Export orientation was captured as percentage of sales due to export. 
 
Technological competition in a spin-off’s technological field was - like all following items, 
unless stated otherwise - measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = “does not apply at all”; 7 = 
“applies fully and completely”). Our measure (4 items, α = .78) is based on Sood and Tellis (2005) 
and describes the extent of research conducted in a specific technological field, as reflected in the 
number of active institutions. Our measure for technological uncertainty (3 items, α = .77) was 
conceptually based on the work of Bhide (1994) and Shane (2004: 186-190). We derived an own 
measure for tacit knowledge (3 items, α = .71) that captures the extent to which the founders were 
experts in their fields and knowledge about the core technology was available via external sources. 
Entrepreneurial orientation was operationalized similar to Covin and Slevin (1989). Because the 
original scale referred to established firms, we adjusted some items to the context of spin-offs. As 
the dimensionality of the construct is an area of ongoing debate (Rauch et al., 2009), we factor-
analyzed the items to confirm the original three-factor solution. After dropping items with a factor 
loading of a less then 0.40, the three dimensions innovativeness (2 items, α = .75), proactiveness 
(3 items, α = .64), and risk-taking (2 items, α = .70) emerged. The sum of these dimensions forms 
the final measure for entrepreneurial orientation. An overview of all items and validity information 




We controlled for a number of influences, including team size (number of founders) in the 
pre-founding phase and the number of employees in the post-founding phase, share of full 
professors, industry experience (number of years the founders had worked in the industry), start-
up experience (1 = “at least one founder had previously started a company”, 0 = else), market 
potential (2 items, α = .76), patent effectiveness (rated by patent attorneys on a 7-point Likert-
scale; 1 = “very low effectiveness”, 7 = “very high effectiveness”), venture capital (1 = “at least 
one venture capitalist holds stakes in firm equity”, 0 = else), the spin-off’s R&D intensity (share of 
employees working full time in R&D), and share of full-time entrepreneurs, being inventors who 




Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Tables 2 and 3 display the 
regression results. Since our dependent variables are dummies and counts of scores, we used 
binary logistic regression and negative binomial regression to estimate our models, respectively. 
The likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion suggests that a poisson regression is no adequate 
alternative. Calculations of the variance inflation factor (VIF) reveal no serious multicollinearity 




Please insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
Models 1 and 2 tested academic rationales. Hypothesis 1a suggests a positive relationship 
between institutional publication performance and patent propensity. No significant effect was 
 found for the existence and number of patent applications (H1a not supported). According to 
Hypothesis 1b, patent propensity increases with institutional patenting experience. The effect was 
significant and positive for both outcomes (H1b supported). As stated in Hypothesis 1c, we 
expected a positive relationship between a university’s focus on applied research and patent 
propensity, whereas the effect was not significant (H1c not supported). Models 3 and 4 examine 
business rationales. Hypothesis 2a predicts a positive relationship of network size with patent 
propensity. The effect was significant and positive for the number of applications, but insignificant 
for the existence of applications (H2a partly supported). Hypothesis 2b proposes that export 
orientation has a positive influence on patent propensity. The effect is not significant for both 
dependent variables (H2b not supported). In Hypothesis 2c, we suggested an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between technological competition and patent propensity, which is confirmed for 
existence of applications (H2c partly supported). We investigated entrepreneurial rationales for the 
pre-founding (Models 5 and 6) and post-founding phases (Models 7 and 8). Hypothesis 3a 
predicted that a higher technological uncertainty results in a higher patent propensity. This is 
confirmed for both outcomes in the post-founding phase, but not in the pre-founding phase (H3a 
partly supported). Hypothesis 3b predicts a positive influence of tacit knowledge on patent 
propensity. Again, the effects were positive and significant for both dependent variables only in 
the post-founding phase (H3b partly supported). We also examined how transiting from academia 
to business affects patent decisions. Hypothesis 4a proposed that a faster adoption of the 
entrepreneurial role, as reflected in higher entrepreneurial orientation, increases patent propensity. 
The effect was significant and positive for the number, but not for the existence of patent family 
applications (H4a partly supported). Hypothesis 4b, finally, suggested that academic entrepreneurs 
with at least one patent prior to founding intensify patenting after founding. Given the non-normal 
distribution of the data, we used a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test to examine this 
relationship. Of the 48 spin-offs, 11 applied for more patents, 34 for fewer patents, and 3 for the 
same number of patents. The rank test suggests a decreasing tendency to file patents (Z = -2.83, p 




This article examined why academic entrepreneurs seek patents for their inventions in the 
founding phase and how their patent propensity changes over time. Using data from 160 
technology-based spin-offs from public universities in Germany combined with patent information 
from the PATSTAT database, we find that a mix of academic, business, and entrepreneurial 
rationales shapes patent propensity. Controlling for various confounding influences, academic 
entrepreneurs were more likely to seek patents when their home universities were well 
experienced in patenting, technological competition was at a moderate level, the spin-off engaged 
extensively in inter-firm partnerships, the search for marketable applications of the firm’s core 
technology was highly uncertain, and the founders had accumulated comprehensive tacit 
knowledge. Moreover, academic entrepreneurs high in entrepreneurial orientation patented more 
extensively. Contrary to our expectations, founders with at least one patent prior to founding, 




This study is not without limitations. First, it illuminates a relatively short period of three 
years before and after incorporation to detect changes in patenting decisions. While the pre-
founding results were robust to extending the timeframe to five and seven years, data limitations 
do not allow us to test this for the post-founding phase. We have little insight into how patenting 
behavior develops after that. Future research is therefore necessary to advance our knowledge of 
 how and whether the patent propensity of academic entrepreneurs changes and affects patent 
policies of the growing spin-offs. Second, sampling solely from universities in Germany may yield 
results that are mostly generalizable to this context. Country differences, such as variations in 
jurisdiction, university regulations, university experience with technology commercialization, and 
routines of technology transfer, might generate different conditions for patenting, thereby affecting 
patent propensity. While we have no a priori reason to believe that the findings would fail to apply 
to other country settings, the empirical investigation addressed only one setting.  
 
Implications for research 
 
Our findings are important to several strands of scholarly research because they identify 
academic entrepreneurs as a group with specific patenting rationales. One strand of research has 
shown that individual and institutional influences explain patenting by full-time scientists (e.g. 
Dietz & Bozeman, 2005). Another strand has shown that organizational and environmental 
characteristics account for patenting by established firms (e.g. Arundel & Kabla, 1998). This study 
shows that academic entrepreneurs, while sharing some of the rationales with both groups, seek 
patents for specific, often overlooked rationales: technological uncertainty and tacit knowledge. 
By examining academic entrepreneurs in transition from the academic to the business world, our 
paper provides a first step to bridge the divide between the two literatures on patenting in research 
organizations and firms. The finding of a curvilinear relationship of technological competition 
with patent propensity indicates that academic entrepreneurs are more likely to patent their 
inventions at moderate levels of competition. This observation extends the work in the field of 
technological change that has established a link between technology life cycles and firm formation 
rates (Shane, 2001) by demonstrating that technological rivalry also influences the decision to 
patent. Moreover, it points to one possible explanation why scholars of industrial patenting have 
suggested a positive, but found a negative relationship between technological competition and 
patent propensity (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). Moreover, the unexpected finding that academic 
entrepreneurs with at least one patent prior to founding patented less after founding warrants 
further investigation. One possible explanation lies in the role of the university administration: 
Institutional regulations or pressures might have led some founders to disclose and (let the 
university) patent their inventions in the pre-founding phase, although individual preferences or 
strategic considerations suggested otherwise. After founding, they therefore reduce or stop 
patenting efforts. This argument is consistent with our finding that the entrepreneurial rationales 
examined here significantly influence patenting only after founding. As a second explanation, the 
post-founding phase might draw the entrepreneurs’ attention to activities not conducive to yield 
patentable inventions. This could include activities such as acquiring venture capital, matching 
prototypes to customer needs, or establishing production facilities. Finally, entrepreneurship 
scholars have regarded patent effectiveness as an important influence on firm formation rates (e.g. 
Lowe, 1993; Shane, 2001). The decision to patent may therefore be closely linked to the decision 
to create a technology spin-off. An alternative perspective is proposed in this paper: The patent 
propensity of academic entrepreneurs is influenced by various, partly competing rationales and 
might be time-variant. The results, indeed, confirm that many founders do not seek patents at all 
within the founding phase. Moreover, the patent propensity changes throughout the founding 
process and is affected by different rationales thereby indicating that he creation of academic spin-
offs is not inevitably linked to considerations of patentability.  
 
Implications for practice 
 
This study also offers several practical implications. Given the various rationales at play, 
academic entrepreneurs are encouraged to critically reflect on their patenting rationales and 
 whether these rationales are adequately balanced. The specific results also point them to the 
importance of incorporating the level of technology competition in their patent decisions. In fields 
of moderate competition, the benefits from patenting may justify the costs and risks involved. The 
opposite may be the case in fields of very low or very high competition. Moreover, our findings 
for tacit knowledge indicate that entrepreneurs high in such knowledge are in an advantageous 
position: They could run a mixed patent-secrecy strategy by codifying some of their knowledge in 
patents and keeping other parts secret as a complementary safeguard. This approach enables them 
to reap major benefits associated with patenting, while taking fewer risks compared to less 
knowledgeable colleagues. The results for technological uncertainty suggest that when the time 
and resources needed to develop marketable products from the core technology is hardly 
predictable, academic entrepreneurs should consider patent protection, as in this situation pursuing 
alternative protection strategies may be often difficult or ineffective. The principal results also 
remind university policy-makers that patenting may not always be in the best interest of 
technology spin-offs. Conflicts of interest could lead academic entrepreneurs to conceal 
discoveries from the administration or technology transfer offices to patent technology, when 
patenting is a suboptimal strategy for the spin-off. This suggests to consider alternative ways to 
claim ownership in inventions, for instance, by taking equity in the new venture. 
 
CONTACT: Sascha G. Walter; sascha.walter@bwl.uni-kiel.de; (T): 431-880-4378; (F) 431-880-
1213; University of Kiel, Westring 425, 24118 Kiel, Germany. 
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 Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.a 
 
  Variable Mean SD Min Max 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   
1. Patents (t0)b .30 .46 .00 1.00 -                    2. Patents (t1) .23 .42 .00 1.00 .40 *** -                  3. Num. of patents (t0) .88 1.96 .00 12.00 .98 *** .42 *** -                4. Num. of patents (t1) 1.03 3.99 .00 44.00 .40 *** .99 *** .27 *** -              5. Inst. publication performance 11.34 9.28 .00 5.17 -.05  -.01  .06  -.01  -            6. Inst. patenting experience .58 2.58 .00 23.60 -.05  -.08  .19 * .00  .02  -          7. Focus on applied research 49.69 46.89 .04 197.74 .03  .14 t .18 * .02  -.01  .08  -        8. Network size (ln) 1.82 .84 .00 5.04 .06  .09  .02  .01  .07  -.06  -.07  -      9. Export orientation (ln) .12 .19 .00 .69 .06  .16 * -.02  .00  .00  -.02  -.03  .11  -    10. Technological competition 3.68 1.41 1.00 7.00 .07  .05  .01  .17 * -.02  -.08  -.09  .09  -.01  -  11. Technological uncertainty 3.61 1.38 1.00 7.00 .08  .27 *** .10  .09  .01  .07  -.07  .00  .14 t -.09  12. Tacit knowledge 5.05 1.35 1.00 7.00 .03  .09 t .09  .14 t -.13 t .01  .05  .12  .05  -.06  13. Entrepreneurial orientation 13.89 3.12 3.50 21.00 .12  .20 ** .09  .18 * -.05  .02  .14 t .13 t .19 * .00  14. Team size 3.25 1.97 1.00 14.00 .13  .20 ** .16 * .08  .04  -.08  .01  .10  -.06  .17 * 15. Industry experience 8.47 11.67 .00 8.00 .09 * .02  .21 ** .04  .01  -.03  .00  .18 * -.04  .00  16. Share of professors .13 .22 .00 1.00 .16 * .09  .08  .00  -.07  -.09  -.05  .04  .01  .07  17. Patent effect. (techn. field) .64 .48 .00 1.00 .32 *** .28 *** .25 ** .18 * -.05  .06  .00  .20 * .07  -.02  18. Patent effect. (industry) 4.96 1.03 3.00 6.37 .26 *** .21 ** .18 * .16 * .00  .05  .14 t .01  .25 ** .03  19. Market potential 5.26 1.48 1.50 7.00 .03  .02  .03  .10  -.08  -.15 t .05  .20 * -.16 * .21 ** 20. Start-up experience .36 .48 .00 1.00 .17 * -.06  .15 t -.06  .02  -.15  -.14 t .08  -.22 ** -.02  21. Number of employees (ln) 1.45 .93 .00 4.39 -.03  .16 t .05  .27 *** -.01  -.03  -.04  .18 * .19 * .09  22. Venture capital .15 .36 .00 1.00 -.01  .07  .00  .09  .11  -.09  -.05  -.07  .03  -.04  23. R&D intensity .81 .22 .16 1.00 .08  .00  .06  -.03  -.07  .02  .07  -.12  -.10  -.09  24. Share of full-time entr. .49 .40 .00 1.00 -.02   .01   .02   -.06   -.03   .01   .15 t .07   .11   .01   
a n = 160, t p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). b t0 = pre-founding phase, t1 = post-founding phase. 
 Table 1 (continued) – Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.a 
 
  Variable 11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   
1. Patents (t0)b 
                            2. Patents (t1) 
                            3. Num. of patents (t0) 
                            4. Num. of patents (t1) 
                            5. Inst. publication 
f c                             6. Inst. patenting experienced 
                            7. Focus on applied researche 
                            8. Network size (ln) 
                            9. Export orientation (ln) 
                            10. Technological competition 
                            11. Technological uncertainty -                            12. Tacit knowledge -.11  -                          13. Entrepreneurial orientation .01  .24 ** -                        14. Team size .24 ** -.04  -.02  -                      15. Industry experience -.05  .05  .14 t .30 *** -                    16. Share of professors -.08  .07  .03  -.08  -.05  -                  17. Patent effect. (techn. field)f .04  .18 * .03  -.13  -.01  .04  -                18. Patent effect. (industry) .03  .05  .14 t -.12  -.18 * .01  0.47 *** -              19. Market potential -.18 * .14 t .15 t .03  .03  .11  0.03  0.00  -            20. Start-up experienceg -.02  .06  .09  .21 ** .40 *** .04  0.01  -0.05  0.02  -          21. Number of employees (ln) .06  -.06  .21 ** .17 * .01  .02  -0.11  0.07  0.09  0.06  -        22. Venture capitalh .05  .01  .18 * -.07  -.08  .10  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.02  0.14 t -      23. R&D intensity .21 ** .00  .04  -.09  -.09  .09  0.11  0.09  -0.06  -0.06  -0.64 *** -0.11  -    24. Share of full-time entr. -.12   -.10   .11   -.09   -.08   -.23 ** -0.13 t 0.02   0.09   0.07   0.26 *** 0.01   -0.20 * - 
 a n = 160, t p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). b t0 = pre-founding phase, t1 = post-founding phase. 
 Table 2 – Results for Regression Analyses of Academic and Business Rationales.a 
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Model 3  
 

















                 Academic rationales 
               
 







        
 
Inst. patenting experience 0.18 ** 0.07 
 
0.10 ** 0.04 
        
 







                         Business rationales 
               
 
Network size (ln) 





0.50 * 0.25 
 
Export orientation (ln) 










        
1.62 * 0.81 
 
1.24 t 0.73 
 
Technological competition2 
        





                 Control variables 
               
 
Team size 0.28 * 0.13 
 
0.37 ** 0.12 
        
 







        
 
Share of professors 1.85 * 0.85 
 
1.43 * 0.59 
        
 
Patent effectiveness 2.00 *** 0.50 
 
1.84 *** 0.46 
 
0.53 * 0.22 
 
0.61 ** 0.19 
 






























Number of employees (ln) 
        
0.87 * 0.31 
 
1.41 *** 0.27 
 
Venture capital 





1.39 ** 0.53 
 
R&D intensity 
        
3.29 * 1.17 
 
4.61 *** 1.30 
 
Share of full-time entrepreneurs 








                 
 
Log Likelihood -79.36 
   
-173.92 
   
-73.39 





   
214.26 
   
138.17 
   
226.23 
    Pseudo-R2 0.19      0.16       0.14       0.27     
a n = 160, t p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). b t0 = pre-founding phase, t1 = 
post-founding phase. 
 
 Table 3 – Results for Regression Analyses of Entrepreneurial Rationales.a 
 
  


































               
 








0.57 ** 0.20 
 
0.44 ** 0.17 
 








0.42 * 0.18 
 
0.58 *** 0.14 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation 





0.14 * 0.06 
                 Control variables 
               
 
Team size 0.22 t 0.14 
 
0.26 * 0.13 
        
 







        
 
Share of professors 1.60 t 0.84 
 
1.09 t 0.66 
        
 
Patent effectiveness 1.97 *** 0.48 
 
1.82 *** 0.41 
 
0.49 * 0.22 
 
0.58 ** 0.22 
 
































Number of employees (ln) 
        
0.71 * 0.33 
 
0.84 *** 0.24 
 
Venture capital 










        
2.12 t 1.18 
 
1.64 t 0.96 
 
Share of full-time entr. 








                 
 
Log Likelihood -82.15 
   
-180.93 
   
-67.57 





   
269.52 
   
147.33 
   
286.03 
    Pseudo-R2 0.16      0.13      0.21       0.31     
a n = 160, t p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test). b t0 = pre-founding phase, t1 = 
post-founding phase. 
 
